TEIMUN
THE EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL
THE YEMENI CIVIL WAR
30th
1987/2017
Dear delegates,

At this year’s Security Council you will be given the power and responsibility to bring to an end one of the most complicated and yet least reported political struggles of the turbulent Middle East. It is a conflict which involves not merely the inhabitants of its state but which serves as a platform for regional, power strong arming. Solving the political beehive that is the Yemeni Civil War will not just produce tools to address the Shia-Sunni divide, but perhaps also function as an embryonic first step towards understanding and ending similar multi-state conflicts like the Syrian Civil War, and to create lasting cooperation between rivalling Middle Eastern states. While this daunting task may seem difficult, the many potential fruits of a real diplomatic solution will be worth every effort.

Guiding you along the way will be your enthusiastic and diligent chairs, Teun Janssen and Maxime Voorbraak, experienced MUN’ers with immense enthusiasm. We hope to make TEIMUN 2017 as productive and fun as the years before, and to provide all of you with memories you will remember for years to come!

Any questions you may have about the conference and the Security Council in particular will be swiftly answered by us.

We are at your disposal.

Diplomatic regards,

Teun and Maxime

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Introduction

During the Roman period, Yemen was known as “Arabia Felix”, the happy land. It certainly no longer is. With Syria currently being the focal point of Middle-Eastern political turbulence due to its unrivaled loss of life and material destruction, other regional conflicts are left relatively unreported and unaddressed by the international community.\(^1\) The crisis in Yemen is one such an instance. At the same time, rather paradoxically, it is also often referred to as “the next Syria.”\(^2\) In some ways, the conflicts are similar. Yemen is, like Syria, the battleground of a struggle for spheres of influence between Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, we should not overstate the importance of external influences. While foreign actors exert important pressures on the parties involved, the current situation is to a large degree also the result of internal administrative incompetence, corrupt leadership and economic backwardness.\(^3\) The result has been a civil war which has raged since 2015 but has its roots in a political struggle which goes back decades.

This war has caused the deaths of thousands, as well as the displacement of millions, and has brought the country to the brink of humanitarian disaster.\(^4\) Additionally, it has provided extremist organisations like Al-Qaeda with the perfect opportunity to expand their territories. It is important to remember that Yemen is and has historically been a very decentralised, tribal society, which makes for intricate local struggles that are often hard to grasp by the international community. The following background paper seeks to give an overview over the multifarious factors that are at play in the complex situation that Yemen finds itself in.

Historical Background

The roots of the North-South divide, which marks Yemen’s contemporary political situation, go back centuries, and this is reflected in the fact that Yemen had been split between separate Northern and Southern entities until 1990. Northern Yemen had been ruled by Zaydi (local branch of Shia) imams until 1962, when it became the Yemen Arab Republic after a republican civil war.\(^5\) Southern Yemen, on the other hand, is a majority Sunni region and had been under British control ever since 1839. In 1963, nationalist movements began an insurrection against British rule and in 1967, Britain officially handed over control of its former protectorate to the rebels, marking the founding of the People’s Republic of South Yemen. The new state became dominated by socialist factions and it quickly turned into a marxist

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Both of these relatively young states, while ideologically separated, sought unification with each other based on their shared history. While border clashes were a recurring trend, these did not sever attempts at unification. After oil reserves on the border of the states were discovered in the late 1980’s, efforts towards unification sped up to allow for the shared exploitation of these resources. In May 1990 a unity constitution was agreed upon, which was ratified the following year by an overwhelming majority of Yemenis in both countries. The agreement provided for a multi-party state, free elections and the protection of basic human freedoms. The former head of state of North Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, became the head of state of a united Yemen and Ali Salim Al-Beidh, the former head of state of South-Yemen became head of government.7

Figure 1: North and South Yemen, Wikipedia.8

A dispute in the coalition government in 1994, which was the result of former Southern socialists’ dissatisfaction with a perceived Northern dominance in the new state, culminated in a short civil war, with South-Yemen attempting to secede from the new state. Saudi Arabia supported these Southern secessionists. The North Yemeni military eventually restored control over the South and President Saleh thereafter strengthened his hold over Yemeni politics. Saleh, himself Zaidi, has since been blamed for the continued neglect of the concerns of the predominantly Sunni South. Since 2007, many Southern activists have united in the “Southern Movement”, a loose coalition of groups which share the aim of Southern independence. While their official policy is one of peaceful resistance, armed clashes between security forces and the Southern opposition have led to the deaths of thousands.9

6 Idem
7 Idem
It is crucial to understand the importance of religion in Yemen’s history and in particular the role played by the Zaidi Shia population in the North. The Zaidi Yemenis, making up roughly half of the country’s population, are concentrated mostly in the North-West of the country. A popular narrative amongst the Zaidi is that they are being discriminated against by the central government, which has left their land underdeveloped and ripe with corruption. Zaidi majority regions have also been the target of Saudi Wahhabism conversion campaigns in the past, which feeds into the perception that their culture and religion is under attack. These internal and external pressures became the catalysts for the emergence of a movement dubbed the “Zaydi revival”. Hussein al-Houthi and his brother Mohammed al-Houthi founded a number of organisations aimed at countering Saudi and American influence in Yemen, as well as the corruption and marginalisation of Zaidi lands. These groups and their supporters amongst the Zaidi population became known as “Houthis”. From 2004 until 2010, the Houthis waged a rebellion against the Saleh government until a ceasefire was reached. President Saleh is a Zaydi himself but sees the Houthis as attempting to overthrow secular principles.

Figure 2: Division in Yemen in 2012, Wikipedia.

The Houthis have galvanised support beyond their traditional strongholds in the North West, as many Yemenis have felt left behind by the government in

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/04/who-are-yemen-houthis/390111/
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Sana’a. Since his ascension to the post of President of United Yemen, Saleh has been accused of encouraging nepotism, maintaining his hold on power through abusing the tribal relations and providing local elites with powerful positions, as well as appointing top military personnel amongst his closest followers. Additionally, Saleh is known to have amassed a vast illegally acquired fortune. In January 2011, inspired by the ongoing Arab Spring revolutions across the Arab world, massive street protests erupted in Yemen calling for an end to unemployment, brutality by security forces, corruption and general economic neglect. The protests soon surged and started to include calls for the immediate resignation of Saleh, in part due to his plans to rewrite the constitution and eliminate term limits, in effect making him President for life. During this revolution, the Houthis took advantage of the government’s weakness, and its preoccupation with protesters, to establish direct control over the Houthi heartland Sadah. Saleh was eventually forced to sign a Gulf Cooperation Council brokered agreement in November 2011, in which he transferred power to his Vice-President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, awaiting new elections. Saleh gained immunity from prosecution in the process. As part of the brokered peace agreement, a National Dialogue Conference took place between March 18 2013 and 24 January 2014 to restructure Yemen and make it a stable, functioning state for all.

The Yemeni Civil War

The Onset of the Civil War

While initially promising on many fronts, The National Dialogue Conference was ultimately rejected by Houthi leaders and most Southern representatives, due to its main point of conflict: dividing Yemen amongst 6 new provinces which would strip the control by Houthis and Southern leaders of their respective consolidated strongholds. Mr Hadi had since struggled to deal with a variety of problems, including attacks by Al-Qaeda, a separatist movement in the south, the continuing loyalty of many military officers to Mr Saleh, as well as corruption, unemployment and food insecurity.
The final straw, however, came in August 2014, as the Houthis called for mass protests following a newly implemented removal of fuel subsidies. On the 21st of September, the situation took on a military dimension, as Houthi forces took control of the Yemeni capital of Sana’a. This rapid takeover shocked the population and former President Saleh has been accused of ordering military units still loyal to him to stand down during the events. As a response, the UN brokered a deal to establish a unity government between the Houthis and Hadi’s government. Despite these efforts, the Houthis seized the presidential palace in January 2015 and forced President Hadi and his ministers to resign. The following month, the Houthis moved to dissolve parliament and instituted a ‘revolutionary committee’ with the purpose of governing Yemen as an interim authority. While Hadi was confined to house arrest, he managed to escape to the city of Aden on the 21st of February, and subsequently declared the Houthi takeover as illegitimate, stating that he remained the constitutional President of Yemen. On the 21st of March, Hadi declared Aden as the temporary capital until Sana’a could be reclaimed from the Houthis, while Houthi forces mobilised for an invasion of the remainder of Southern Yemen not yet under their control. By the 25th of March Houthi forces had reached Aden, partially due to Yemeni military units loyal to former President Saleh siding with the Houthis, and Hadi fled the city to Saudi Arabia.

The following day, a military coalition led by Saudi Arabia commenced a campaign with the goal of reinstating Hadi’s government in Yemen, preventing Houthi forces from taking over Aden. Saudi Arabia sees the Houthis as an Iranian

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proxy movement and as a threat to its influence in Yemen.\textsuperscript{24} Since then, the military situation has shifted repeatedly but has caused neither side to attain overwhelming strategic superiority, leading to a military stalemate and an increasingly dire humanitarian situation, as besieged cities lack basic supplies. So far, over 10.000 people have been killed in the conflict.\textsuperscript{25}

**Parties to the Conflict**

The following section aims to provide an overview over the parties to the conflict. To begin with, the Revolutionary Committee, later reformed into the Supreme Political Council (SPC) is the interim authority in the capital of Sana’a and consists of the Houthis, as well as Saleh’s political party, the General People’s Congress, and is supported by military forces who are loyal to Saleh. While Saleh had fought a Houthi rebellion in the past, he has allied with them in a pragmatic alliance since his primary aim is to take revenge on his disposers and to reclaim political influence in Yemen.\textsuperscript{26} It is internationally supported by Iran and Hezbollah. Its precise political goals are unknown, but they aim for some form of autonomy and/or political privilege for Zaydi Yemenis.\textsuperscript{27}

On the other side of the conflict stands the Hadi Government, which is the internationally recognised government of Yemen. It consists of loyalist Yemeni security forces, tribal fighters loyal to Hadi, so called Popular Committees (local ad-hoc militias formed in response to Houthi and AQAP aggression) and the Southern Movement. While still aiming for Southern Secession, the latter sees the Houthi invasion as a larger threat and has temporarily allied with Hadi.\textsuperscript{28} The government is supported internationally by the Saudi-led coalition, the US, the UK, and France. Most of the rest of the international community supports Hadi but offers no concrete assistance. It aims to restore the legitimate government of Yemen to full control of the country.\textsuperscript{29}

However, also fundamentalist Islamist groups, most importantly Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Yemen Province (ISIL), have established themselves in Yemen. While the two groups are not allied, and often fight each other on the ground, they share the political goal of establishing an Islamist government in Yemen. AQAP is far larger in Yemen than ISIL but the latter has gained in strength over the course of the

\textsuperscript{26} Salisbury, Peter. “Yemen’s Former President Ali Abdullah Saleh behind Houthis rise.” Financial Times. March 26, 2015. https://www.ft.com/content/dbbc1ddc-d3c2-11e4-99bd-00144feab7de
\textsuperscript{28} Idem
\textsuperscript{29} Idem
Islamist organisations often act as leverage for the other states in the conflict, who accuse each other of supporting AQAP and/or IS.\textsuperscript{31}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Military_Situation_in_Yemen_in_January_2017_South_Front.png}
\caption{Military Situation in Yemen in January 2017, South Front.\textsuperscript{32}}
\end{figure}

\textbf{Humanitarian Situation and Terrorism}

In January, the number of casualties of the conflict surpassed 10,000 people.\textsuperscript{33} The humanitarian situation in Yemen is dire and it is feared that the situation will only deteriorate in the future.\textsuperscript{34} Yemen and most of the other states currently involved in hostilities are signatory to a number of international treaties protecting human rights, such as the Geneva Convention, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Saudi Arabia being a notable exception to the latter). Nonetheless, these have not prevented widespread reports on human rights abuses. SPC, Islamist and Pro-Hadi forces are all known to have committed a number of these breaches, which include indiscriminate attacks against civilians. AQAP and IS have also claimed responsibility for a number of high profile suicide bombings. Beyond that, Houthi forces have launched indiscriminate

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31} BBC. “Yemen crisis: who is fighting whom.” BBC. March 28, 2017. \texttt{http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423}
\item \textsuperscript{32} Military Situation in Yemen on January 10, 2017 (MAP UPDATE), South Front, \texttt{https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-january-10-2017-map-update/}
\item \textsuperscript{34} BBC. “Yemen Conflict: How bad is the humanitarian crisis?” \textit{BBC News}, March 28 2017. \texttt{http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34011187}
\end{itemize}
cross-border attacks on Saudi civilian areas in order to exert political pressure.\textsuperscript{35}

AQAP and Houthi forces have also been accused of disrupting and attacking civilian shipping vessels, which has caused great gaps in Yemeni export and import quotas.\textsuperscript{36} Furthermore, Houthi forces have attacked US naval vessels with Iranian supplied anti-ship missiles.\textsuperscript{37} Additionally, the Saudi-led coalition has repeatedly been accused of deliberately targeting civilian areas (60\% of reported casualties in the civil war are a result of coalition airstrikes), while Houthi and pro-Saleh forces are known for hiding amongst residential areas to establish human shields.\textsuperscript{38} The Saudi-imposed land, air and naval blockade of Yemen, which aims at stopping illegal weapon deliveries and other illegal foreign involvement in the war, has also prevented vital supplies from reaching critical areas. Saudi Arabia has been condemned by the UN and various humanitarian organisations for these actions.\textsuperscript{39} The United States and the United Kingdom are known to supply precision weaponry to Saudi Arabia which it uses in its air campaign.\textsuperscript{40}

The United States has been actively pursuing a policy of low-intensity intervention in Yemen, mostly by targeting terrorist groups with special forces operations and drone strikes.\textsuperscript{41} While dubbed ‘precision’ operations, they do not completely remove the possibility of human error.\textsuperscript{42} One of these most recent raids led to dozens of civilian deaths.\textsuperscript{43} The Hadi government allows the US to conduct these strikes since it degrades the capacity of AQAP and other terrorist organisations fighting the government. Nevertheless, the legality of these actions is often disputed and remains unclear.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{40} Mohamed, Rasha. ”The UK has made 10 times more in arms sales to Saudi Arabia than it’s given in aid to Yemen” The Independent, March 22, 2017.
\textsuperscript{44} Martin, Kate. ”Are U.S. Drone Strikes Legal?” Center for American Progress, April 1, 2016. https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2016/04/01/134494/are-u-s-drone-strikes-legal/
Indirectly, the war has led to the rights to health and standard of living of many Yemenis being severely impaired. Amongst others, this arises from a lack of sufficient and clean water, housing and basic civilian infrastructure. 61% of the country's population is in need of humanitarian assistance, six out of ten Yemenis is not food secure and only one in four Yemenis have access to clean drinking water. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is active in Yemen, but is severely underfunded and often unable to reach critical areas due to the Saudi imposed blockade and continuing hostilities on the ground.

While Yemen has signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child, one in three regional combatants are children. Children, like other civilians, also suffer from the lack of health facilities (hundreds of which have been destroyed or occupied by militants) and the almost complete destruction of the education system (1.8 million Yemeni children are unable to go to school). Moreover, half a million children under the age of five suffer from malnutrition, and a child dies every ten minutes from preventable diseases. The conditions of war and malnutrition have also led to an unprecedented increase in birth defects. Last but not least, women have also reportedly been victims of gender based violence, including widespread allegations of rape by both SPC and pro-Hadi forces.

International response

On the 14th of April 2015, the UN passed resolution 2216 on the establishment of an arms embargo against forces loyal to former President Saleh and the Houthi movement. The resolution also called for the immediate withdrawal of rebel forces from occupied areas, the re-establishment of the internationally recognised government to Sana’a, the resumption of peace talks and the investigation and prevention of human rights abuses. The Resolution has had its mandate renewed

multiple times since, but no substantial results have been produced. There have
since been several UN-directed attempts at establishing ceasefires and peace
negotiations in Yemen.\footnote{51} While none of these attempts were successful in halting
hostilities for longer than 72 hours, the temporary ceasefires are crucial for the
delivery of humanitarian relief.\footnote{52} There have also been suggestions for peace
mediation by Iran, which were turned down by Saudi Arabia, as the latter suspects
Iran of supporting the Houthis with aid.\footnote{53}

The Gulf Cooperation Council, a diplomatic alliance between the Gulf states
led by Saudi Arabia, of which Yemen is not a member, has also signalled its
willingness to mediate in the conflict. However, these proposals have been
repeatedly rejected by the Houthis who do not trust Sunni Saudi Arabia, with its
history of hostility to the Houthi movement, to address Houthi interests. There are
also plans on the table for Yemen’s eventual application for GCC membership.\footnote{54} The
conflict in Yemen is often viewed within the prism of the ongoing regional cold-war
between Saudi Arabia and Iran. While it would be a mistake to simplify the civil war
as a yet another theater of regional strong arming, the active role played by Saudi
Arabia is certainly a reaction to what the Saudi leadership perceives as an Iran
aligned Houthi movement taking over power in a neighbouring state which had for
decades been within the Saudi sphere of influence.\footnote{55} These concerns are partially
confirmed by reports of Iranian weapon and supply deliveries to Houthi rebels.
Increased Iranian illegal arms exports have been partially attributed to the freeing
up of Iranian assets and the alleviated economy following the 2015 Iran Nuclear
Deal Framework.\footnote{56}

\textbf{Conclusion}

The war in Yemen has dragged on for 3 years, and while the people's trust in
national unity has been shattered, it has also exhausted the ability and the will to
fight of all the combatants. Peace is possible, but it will need to include terms
favourable to all sides of the conflict. Any immediate ceasefire and constructive

\footnote{54} Al Yafai, Faisal. "Yemen will not be easily persuaded to join the GCC." \textit{The National}, February 21, 2016. http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/yemen-will-not-be-easily-persuaded-to-join-the-gcc
peace talks must include the cooperation of most of the directly involved parties in order to be truly successful while the threat posed by AQAP and ISIL could provide Yemenis with a sense of shared purpose. Additionally, the immediate humanitarian problems in Yemen need to be addressed and the rule of law restored. In the long run, Yemen must be able to rebuild its infrastructure and reestablish a sense of national unity to prevent the state from ripping itself apart yet again. It is crucial that this process is fully democratic and inclusive, to prevent it from collapsing like the National Dialogue Conference has before. While this will not be an easy task, it is in the realm of possibility.

The UN can and must play a role in overseeing these developments in one form or another. In line with resolution 2216, it must also continue efforts to disarm combatants and prevent foreign actors from re-igniting the flames of conflict. There is also a major role for the GCC in this matter, and if the Houthis agree to a peace, Yemen’s admission into this organisation could help it gain a much-needed sense of stability and trust with its neighbours.

Questions a Resolution Must Answer (QARMAs)

1. What can the UNSC do to bring hostilities between SPC and pro-Hadi forces to an end and to address the legitimate concerns by all sides in the conflict?

2. In what way can the UNSC implement effective disarmament of the parties to the conflict in order to deescalate the situation, in line with resolution 2216?

3. How can the UNSC help to bring to swift justice those individuals who have committed crimes against humanity or other human rights abuses?

4. What can the UNSC do to alleviate the critical humanitarian situation in Yemen, in particular in regards to its water and food crisis, right to live and children’s rights?

5. What, if any, should be the role of the UNSC in the establishment of fair, effective and inclusive national institutions of legislative, executive and judicial governance?

6. How can the UNSC help to restore the international community’s trust in Yemen, and to create the socio-economic foundations necessary for future political stability?

7. Which measures can be taken by the UNSC in order to roll-back the spread of Islamist terrorism in Yemen?
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Excellent source for General Summary of the situation and visualisation: http://www.ecfr.eu/mena/yemen Excellent source for historical perspective:


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