



CONQUERING COMPLEXITY AS
AN INTERNATIONAL AGENT

LIBYA: RECONSTRUCTING A STATE

SECURITY COUNCIL

1. Welcome Letter

The Security Council

The Security Council is an essential part to the UN infrastructure.. It consists of 15 members, five of which are permanent member states: France, Russia, Great Britain, the People's Republic of China and the United States of America. The others are elected for a two years term by the General Assembly. The permanent members have the right to veto resolutions or decisions, thus completely blocking them. The Security Council has the ability to initiate international sanctions, establish and legitimize military operations for peacekeeping and it is the sole organ of the UN with the ability to pass internationally binding resolutions.

At UNSC, delegates are expected to solve and navigate around the complex challenges of the Libyan crisis. Arriving at a common solution to the issue will not be easy. However, to an extent, the chairs expect to see delegates engaging with the topic and give their best effort in an attempt to create the best approach to this issue. We will be looking for delegates who play an active role during the debate, diplomacy and negotiation. With that, we wish you the best and an enjoyable learning experience. Good luck and all the best!

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2. Introduction

After years of Gaddafi's leadership, the Libya ended up in turmoil in 2011: civilian protests swept the country, with, among other goals, to do away with Gaddafi's dictatorship. These civilian protests were part of the Arab Spring uprising that were a prominent phenomenon in various countries of the Middle East and Northern Africa. The end of this dictatorship with the death of the aforementioned leader left a power vacuum: rival parliaments, closely tied to political parties and tribes that precede Gaddafi's leadership, rose to power in what became known as the Second Libyan Civil War.

The country has been in upheaval, with violent interventions between the multiple factions. Two major factions are prominent at this moment: a government based in the city of Tobruk, also known as the House of Representatives, and a government based in the city of Tripoli, which is the de jure capital of Libya. The latter is represented and recognized by the UN. There are other forces that still play an important role in this civil war, but they can be grouped under the umbrella term local forces, as most of their endeavors take place on the local or regional level.

The heavily splintered political scene of Libya has immense consequences for security in and around the country. The local population lacks a stable supply of basic needs, and no one faction can secure these needs politically. Because of this lack of central control, illegal arms trade has also proliferated and poses a threat to not only national, but also macro-regional and international security. We must ask whether it is up to the UN Security Council to take action on behalf of the international community and try to bring back security.

3. Problem specification

For the past years, Libya has been characterized by domestic unrest, which includes violence, political instability, civil war and lack of social-welfare since the revolution against Muammar Gaddafi.¹ The problem lies under three main concepts: a lack of collective security, political unrest/democratic instability and human rights. These three challenges encompass the unique complexity that the International Agents must address. However, until today, none of the efforts by the international community made a real change in reconstructing and securing Libya, as they are currently still in the brink of destruction.

First, the pressing security concerns in Libya concern the proliferation of weapons and illegal arms trade. This has happened since the fall of the Gaddafi regime, where stockpiles of weapons were left unsecured and unprotected. Hence, civilians were free to subsequently appropriate weapons, which was then transferred to armed groups. With this fact in mind, illicit trade of arms and weapons within Libya has increased, as well as with the neighboring countries.²³ This resulted in the fact that Libyan rebels can now acquire cheap weapons in the market, especially from countries who do not abide to the law. They can then use this against government officers, and may threaten the creation of a safe election, peace talks and security of the people.

Moreover, The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) established the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) which aims to tackle the problem of security and political challenges, through ensuring an effective transition to democracy hand in hand with the creation of mediation between the government and all the parties.⁴ The transition was also supported by the European Union (EU) through border management, as well as the National Transitional Council (NTC), now the General National Accord (GNA), through the creation of an ad-hoc committee on peace talks, working government, and free elections.⁵⁶ Though it seemed promising at first, they failed to maintain political and collective security, evident from the continuous uprising from the regional militias in taking over the capital government (2015-2016), opposing the UN-backed government and the failures of peace talks and ceasefire.

¹ Bhardwaj, Development of Conflict in Arab Spring Libya and Syria: From Revolution to Civil War, 2012, p. 1-81.

² UN HRC, Investigation by OHCHR on Libya: detailed findings (A/HRC/31/CRP.3), 2016, p. 18.; SANA, The Online Trade of Light Weapons in Libya, 2016, p. 1-8.

³ UN Security Council, Libya (S/RES/1973 (2011)), 2011, p. 6; UN Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya (S/2015/128), 2015, p. 9,26-27

⁴ UN DPA, Mediation Support Unit - Annual Report, 2014, p. 15, UN Security Council, Libya (S/RES/2144 (2014)), 2014, p.1-4.

⁵ "National Transitional Council Libya." NTC, 2019, <http://ntclibya.org>.

⁶ "Libya and the EU." Delegation of the European Union to Libya, 12 May 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/libya/1447/libya-and-eu_en.

Furthermore, a strong state monopoly of government institutions and corrupt use of violence by its army towards the people, possess a complex problem in terms of recruiting non-corrupt military men to protect the citizens. The lack of transparency and accountability in the government becomes a complex issue for a legitimate Libyan government to retain control, peace, and security in Libya. Libya does not have an official state army, as they must rely on a complex combination of security forces from different factions inside the government. The forces are based on their geographical, ideological and tribal affiliation with different economic and political interests. Some are regarded as a national army, while some are just local security or criminal enterprises. Hence, it became a problem, as the government cannot or has little control and supervision of these groups which might deviate during their operations and put Libyan officials in jeopardy.⁷

Moreover, since 2011, violent acts against certain groups of minority based on their identity or perceived social status or political affiliation have increased. The current investigations are not yet effective, as many perpetrators are still not identified nor investigated. The Security Council since then has started to strengthen institutional support for the Judicial Police on the treatment of prisoners, human rights provisions on Internally displaced persons, refugees, migrants as well as missing persons. In addition to this, the International community must uphold the notion of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) which aimed to protect its citizens from crime against humanity by one's government. Thus, this will give the Libyan government a higher degree of accountability and responsibility of International Human Rights towards its people to avoid any oppression of civil society.⁸ Meanwhile, the long waged war has resulted in vast waves of refugees and asylum seekers with low social welfare, and an increased rate in poverty and injustice. Libya is currently lacking in basic humanitarian needs due to the fact that most access is blockaded by rebels or anti-government supporters, which hindered a smooth distribution of logistics.

4. Questions A Resolution Must Answer (QARMAs)

The following three questions are meant as the basis for your research, and to guide you in your understanding of the issues we believe must be discussed. We expect that, of course, you will follow the Rules of Procedure provided by the GrunnMUN team, and to expand on this issue beyond these three basic questions.

1. What countermeasures should the Libyan government and the international community implement in response to weapon proliferation and illegal arms trade?

⁷ UNHRC, Investigation by OHCHR on Libya: detailed findings (A/HRC/31/CRP.3), 2016, p. 16.

⁸ ICRtoP, Impact of Action in Libya on the Responsibility to Protect, 2011; Dembinski & Reinold, Libya and the Future of the Responsibility to Protect, 2011, p. 1; UN Security Council, Libya (S/RES/2144 (2014)), 2014, p. 4.

2. How can the council increase and ensure the effectivity of the UNSMIL to be properly equipped to support the Libyan government in their priority areas? Which area should be prioritized? Should it be political, humanitarian or security?
3. How can the external parties (international agents) in the conflict bring significant changes to the current reconstruction situation in Libya? In what ways can the Council implement a feasible and viable long-term solution in reforming the security sector?

5. Explanatory section per QARMA

- a. **“How can the external parties (international agents) in the conflict bring significant changes to the current reconstruction situation in Libya? In what ways can the council implement a feasible and viable long-term solution in reforming the security sector?”**

History

Security challenges have been one of the most crucial issues that Libya and the Council must address and pay attention to. The inadequate state authority and the lack of accountable government institutions resulted in a situation of uncertainty for Libyan citizens. Jihadists such as ISIS, family clans, as well as rebels or anti-government protesters armed groups took advantage of this chaotic situation to spread influence in the post-conflict era across the country. Armed groups started to create an allegiance to increase their territorial control and strength to fight against the government. The corrupt and monopolized government institutions have no forces or military men to back them nor to protect the citizens out during massive attacks. Though the UN-backed government managed to withdraw and eradicate ISIS in 2016, there are still anti-government and tribal groups remaining, acquiring benefits from large stockpiles of arms and ammunition left. Hence, the continuous battle, fighting, bombings, and attacks in the cities call for further actions for the government to demonstrate their willingness to act and achieve safety and stability for the Libyan citizens.

Recent developments

For over eight (8) months, Tripoli has been a witness of war that started on the 4th of April 2019, when General Khalifa Haftar, head of the eastern-based militia of the Libyan National Army (LNA) launched an attack against the basecamp of the Government of National Accord. With the lack of professional security forces, Libya currently relies on freelancers, local security and armed groups to protect its people from these attacks. Since then, multiple attacks happened, from the airstrike at the Wadi Rabi's Biscuit factory until the Misrata airport which has been targeted 11 times by airstrikes.

Thereafter, the civilian-military facility that is 250 km east of Tripoli is the only gate for access to the city as all other hubs were struck down.

Furthermore, precision airstrikes also targeted medical personnel, ambulances and healthcare facilities, killing sick or wounded people due to war crimes. The use of air technology had become dominant these days. The LNA is currently supported by drone strikes, where they contract external parties to join the conflict. The advancement of drone facilities and technology had helped LNA to increase the use of precision bomb strikes and gain territorial domination. For this reason, more than 128,000 fled their homes, more than 200 were killed and 270,00 people were affected.

Afterward, the increased involvement by foreign elements or known as “foreign intervention”, caught the attention of the Libyan government. They criticise the armed groups from Chad and Sudan as a direct threat to Libya’s stability and security. For example, the presence of Sudan creates a problem due to the fact that on one hand, the Sudanese Justice and Equality Movement supports the GNA, while the Sudanese armed groups are allied with the Haftar’s force. Hence, this caused chaos regarding the management of security and foreign alliances.

Moreover, this can also be illustrated in the frontlines of South Tripoli, where there is a growing involvement from foreign private military companies (PMCs) and mercenaries that are contracted. They began their expansion of fire towards the city, causing damage to civilians, especially in densely populated areas. Thus, this has caused dilemmas, as the Libyan and US officials accused the Russians of contracting private mercenaries to support the LNA, though, currently there is no direct evidence showing their involvement. However, this has caused major geopolitical tension, it is the up to Libya to choose the ally they truly trust.

Relevant actors/institutions

Based on the adoption of resolution 1970 by the Security Council, NATO was one of the first world national defense agencies to take action in Libya. Since 2011, they increase surveillance and monitor over the Mediterranean, both from the air and sea. After the conflict worsened, NATO implemented three measures: no-fly zone, arms embargo, and attacking Libyan forces targeting civilians as part of their international military effort which they led. Though, NATO then retracted their mission post-Gaddafi downfall, which then left a huge gap for the UNSMIL to fulfill themselves.⁹

⁹“NATO and Libya.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 9 Nov. 2015, https://www.nato.int/eps/ic/natohq/topics_71652.htm.

Furthermore, the United States and the western alliances played an active role in military intervention in Libya which includes drone strikes, airstrikes, and troops deployment. They aim to target rebel groups, terrorists such as ISIS or any armed forces that go against the government or those who jeopardize national security and interest. One might argue that the military intervention had been costly, killing families, destroying strategic infrastructure and buildings due to collateral damage caused by the attacks. However, some argue that it has been successful, as major airstrikes from 2017 have killed more than 17 ISIS militants. Since then, the western alliances has intended to act necessarily to resolve the conflict.¹⁰

Moreover, Russia and the eastern-bloc nations, continues to increase their bilateral relations with Libya, as well as increase their support for the local government through creating peace talks and mediating political dialogues.

International approaches

The UN-backed government, the GNA, recently signed two agreements with Turkey on 27 November 2019, cooperation regarding military and security as well as cooperation on maritime boundary. The military cooperation enables GNA to request troops deployment, which would increase Libya's military support. On the other hand, the maritime agreement will increase Libya's military support in the sea zones.

Furthermore, international approaches have been focused on foreign intervention in the aspect of political and military. Foreign intervention aims to increase Libya's peace and security. This can be depicted and illustrated from several efforts which has been done, which includes but not limited to: creation of ceasefire zones to ensure the secure delivery of humanitarian assistance and act as an area to secure civilians who were impacted by war; peace talks and political dialogues which were mediated by the United Nations, U.S.A, Russia, Arab League, African Union and the European Union; deradicalization, disarmament and demobilization program as a way to keep track of ammunition and weapons that are still in the hands of anti-government armed groups; Public education incentives to remove radical ideology from the roots; democratic elections and government stabilization; and rebuilding infrastructure to boost the current economic growth and social development.

¹⁰“The Current Situation in Libya.” United States Institute of Peace, 19 Apr. 2018, www.usip.org/publications/2018/04/current-situation-libya.

- b. “How can the council increase and ensure the effectivity of the UNSMIL to be properly equipped to support the Libyan government in their priority areas? Which area should be prioritized? Should it be political, humanitarian or security?”**

History

The civil war and civil uprising in Libya caught the attention of the Security Council and the United Nations. Lack of proper humanitarian needs, security and peace, became a major concern for the Security Council to resolve. Six months after the first clashes occurred, in September 2011, the Security Council adopted a resolution (*S/RES/2009 (2011)*) on “Libya”. They established the United Nations (UN) Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).¹¹ Unlike other peacekeeping missions that focuses on military actions, UNSMIL is a political mission under the direction of the Department of Political Affairs. The Security Council appointed Ghassan Salamé, to be the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on this mission. Recently, their mandate was extended until 15 September 2020, based on (*S/RES/2486*) which includes but not limited to: Exercise mediation and good offices support to Libyan political agreements ; Extending state authority and strengthening Libyan institution (restoring public services);Consolidation of economic, security and governance recovery; Promoting humanitarian assistance; Human rights monitoring for vulnerable groups; Enhancing transitional justice; Securing uncontrolled arms and counter-proliferation; Coordination of international assistance.¹²

The UN managed to mediate the government and other rebel parties, evident from the creation of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) in December 2015 and the development of the Government of National Accord (GNA) which is currently still effective until today.¹³

Recent developments

In April 2019, the UN planned to create the National Conference for Libyans to agree on creating a new parliamentary and presidential elections, as well as a constitutional referendum. However, it was halted due to the attack by the Libyan National Army offensive attack on Tripoli. Hence, it became another major setback for the UN’s in terms of its political agenda.

¹¹ UN Security Council, Libya (S/RES/2009 (2011)), 2011, pp. 3-4.

¹² Schauseil, Conflict analysis of the Libyan civil war, 2014, p. 14.

¹³ “UN Security Council June 2016 - Monthly Forecast” UN Security Council, 2016, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2016-06/security_council_elections_2016.php.

Furthermore, in August 2019, UNSMIL Special Representative, Salame, proposed three steps to end the conflict: confidence-building measures between the parties, including humanitarian assistance during Eid al-Adha; high-level conference of “concerned countries”; Libyan meeting of its top leaders and influential people. Until today, five meetings were held in Berlin, working together with Germany, the Arab League countries, United States and the European Union (EU) to support Salome's second step. It was further agreed by both the GNA and the LNA.¹⁴

On the humanitarian context, in October 2019, a health sector assessment conducted an investigation which showed that there is an increase in unmet health needs for Libyan population. It was noted that today, 24% of health facilities are closed due to structural damage caused by conflict, which hinders an effective service of health facility. In addition, children were unable to reach mobile schools, in which most are destroyed or used as shelters for displaced persons. Based on International Organization for Migration (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), Libya is lacking in sanitation, medication and food for more than 343,180 Internally Displaced Person, 447,388 Returnees and 636,426 Migrants.¹⁵

Relevant actors/institutions

UNSMIL has worked with other UN related agencies such as the UNDP, WHO, FAO, UNICEF, OHCHR, UN-WOMEN and UNHCR to assist and send volunteers in order to enhance humanitarian assistance on aspects such as food, shelter, educational facilities, healthcare, sanitation and hospitals. The project also includes rebuilding public infrastructure, social work, social reintegration, psychological assistants, advocacy and technical services.

UNSMIL cooperated with regional bodies, that includes the European Union and African Union. First, the European Union invested in many public projects and activities, mostly on humanitarian logistics for refugees and displaced people, as well as in the aspect of security, such as border control, technology, information and management.¹⁶ Secondly, on October 16, three African members of the Council, Côte d’Ivoire, South Africa, and Equatorial Guinea discuss with the African Union (AU) for a joint AU-UN joint special envoy for Libya. Hence, the special envoy would then be a realisation of AU’s commitment to supporting the reconstruction of Libya and a realisation of the AU and UNSMIL cooperation.

¹⁴ “UN Security Council January 2020 - Monthly Forecast.” UN Security Council, 2020, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2020-01/libya-10.php>

¹⁵ “Libya.” IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, 31 October 2019, <https://dtm.iom.int/libya>.

¹⁶ “EU-Libya Relations.” European Union External Action, 25 September 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/19163/EU-Libya%20relations.

UNSMIL has also engaged cooperation on the national and regional level with the Egyptian government and the Libyan constituencies, such as the House of Representatives (HoR), to conduct several meetings to discuss the UN's continuous efforts to support Libya's political process. The Egyptian government engaged in cooperation with the HoR to meet independently and discuss the restructuring of the Libyan government as well as ways to increase the assembly's integrity and find ways for a desire peaceful resolution to the conflict.

International approaches

First, it was noted that the UN's 2019 humanitarian response for Libya was funded close to 50%, with \$101.3 outstanding out of \$201.6 million. This is parallel with the UN and its humanitarian partners on an effort which have reached over 310,000 people in Libya with humanitarian assistance in 2019. Most of the funds were directed under the Libya Humanitarian Response Plan. Hence, the UN calls other Member States to support and encourage donors to decrease the funding gap/discrepancy.

Further, UNSMIL managed to create a series of events to support 120 local mediators, to establish networks with civil society, youth and tribal leaders to achieve peace and security in Libya through opening peace talks and political negotiations. The UN also launched a project for the youth and adolescents to become active agents of peace, security and change. This was coordinated under the UN general framework of "UNSCR 22050 on Youth, Peace and Security" in Libya.

Lastly, the UNSMIL has also worked to create a draft communique which consist of an Operational Annex in which it has two purposes: to serve as an outline of the commitment of the UN meeting in Germany to end the conflict and further advance political process; and to "bridge" intra-Libyan political dialogue under the UN's command and mediation mechanism.¹⁷

¹⁷ "SRSB Ghassan Salame Briefing the Security Council on 18-november 2019." UNSMIL, 18 November 2019, <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/srsg-ghassan-salame-briefing-security-council-18-november-2019>.

c. What countermeasures should the Libyan government and the international community implement in response to weapon proliferation and illegal arms trade?

History

Libya has a long history with illegal arms trade: the UN has taken action on the matter before, as it had put sanctions on the legal export of arms and munitions to Libya from 1992 to 2003.¹⁸ Whenever the Gaddafi government was in power, it never took action to decrease illegal arms trade within the country and with the outside world. This practice is rooted in history, and in the power vacuum that opened up after 2011, illegal arms trade achieved more momentum, entering black markets more prominently. A substantial amount of weaponry ended up with non-state factions after 2011. These have been put towards arming their forces or illegal trade.¹⁹ Libyan weapon trade can be regarded as a driver for instability in the region, and reports have shown that weapons originating from Libya have also entered European black markets, thus posing a threat to international security.²⁰ Understanding that illegal arms trade and weapon proliferation has been a long term dynamic in the area is important to find solutions to this issue: it is quite resistant to sanctions.

Recent developments

In the past years quite a lot has happened with regards to local, regional and international dynamics of illegal arms trade. A quite important development is the imprisonment of Moncef Kartas, a well-respected expert on illegal arms shipments into Libya, after he had cleared security at the international airport in Tunisia on March 26, 2019. He was imprisoned by Tunisian authorities on charges of obtaining national defense secrets and passing them on to an unnamed "foreign state or its agents". He had been researching the exact topic at hand: illegal arms trade in Libya in its current state of turmoil. The arrest is quite confusing, as the charges have not been confirmed and Kartas is an international diplomat, thus assumed to be immune to such arrests.²¹

This is also a unique development when one considers that Tunisia has started its term as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, claiming to be a voice for the Arab world. Curbing illegal arms trade in the area has been a security interest for Tunisia for a long time, and Tunisia is also clearly interested in resolving the turmoil in Libya, working on it with primarily Egypt and Turkey. For such an advocate of stability, it is quite strange that it has not yet enforced the UN sanctions on Libyan arms trade.²²

¹⁸ "Web Trafficking: Analysing the Online Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Libya." SAS-SANA, 2017, 13-15.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Strassari, F., F. Zampagni, "Illicit firearms circulation and the politics of upheaval in North Africa," 435-6.

²¹ DW, "UN arms expert imprisoned in Tunisia on 'fabricated' charges."

²² Atlantic Council, "Tunisia could help enforce Libya's arms embargo."

Relevant actors/institutions

As mentioned before, Tunisia plays an important role at this moment, serving as a non-permanent member on the UNSC and thus having an opportunity to represent Arab world interests and prioritizing security in the region. Still, recent actions have raised question marks about their intentions, with the imprisonment of an important UN diplomat on the matter of illegal arms trade. Currently, it does work on the matter, and could be key in a UNSC discourse.

Political factions in Libya are at the center of illegal arms trade: they have a demand for arms in perspective of the ongoing war. They are thus facilitating this, and have little incentive to stop. The flow of weapons has decreased at the hands of the international community, however.²³ We should acknowledge that the international community has a big impact on the flow of weapons, and that their actions do have an effect on decreasing tensions in the area.

The UN Security Council has condemned the proliferation of arms, and through Resolution 2017 (2011), they aim to diminish this. It calls upon the international community to assist Libya in this endeavor, and further calls upon Libya to work with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

International approaches

The most used approach by far to resolving this problem has been the implementation of sanctions in the past, and these sanctions have had differing rates of effectiveness in the past. What has to be considered is that in the current climate, it is hard to enforce these sanctions: non-state actors are at play, which are not bound to the UN directly. Sanctions did not deter Gaddafi from arms trade in the past, while it must be acknowledged that the international community has successfully affected the flow of weapons in recent years.

UNSMIL has been active in the area and in contact with the factions on topics related to security. It could prove effective in affecting trade, and within its mandate is the implementation of an international arms embargo, which could prove effective. It is still quite a new organ of the UN, so its effectiveness is yet to be seen.

6. Sources for further research

United Nations Support Mission in Libya. (n.d.). UN in Libya [Website]. Retrieved 5 January 2019 from:
<https://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=5110&language=en-US>

²³ Strassari, F., F. Zampagni, "Illicit firearms circulation and the politics of upheaval in North Africa," 442-3.

Delegates can use this material to see the current overview of the UNSMIL operation/mission that is currently operating in Libya. Delegates can use this to address the challenges and propose new solutions to fix the current loopholes inside the UNSMIL operation.

United Nations Support Mission in Libya. (2015). Libyan Political Agreement. Retrieved 3 January 2019 from:
<https://unsmil.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=miXuJYkQAQg%3D&tabid=3559&mid=6187&language=fr>

Delegates should consider this document to evaluate and analyze the current legitimate legal basis (LPA) of the Libyan government (GNA). Hence, this document is of high importance for delegates to understand the current situation of reconstruction in Libya.

Gartenstein-Ross, D., & N. Barr. (2015). Dignity and Dawn: Libya's Escalating Civil War. Retrieved 7 January 2019 from:
<https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Gartenstein-Ross-Barr-Dignity-and-Dawn-Libya-s-EscalatingCivil-War-February2015.pdf>

The report gives a great overview on the conflict development that had happened between 2011 and 2015. The report gives evaluates the role of international agencies, and the government both on the domestic and international level.

United Nations Children's Fund. (2019). Libya – Humanitarian Situation Report. Retrieved 1 January 2019 from:
<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNICEF%20Libya%20Humanitarian%20Situation%20Report%20-%20January-June%202019.pdf>

The fact sheet summarizes the past work of UNICEF in Libya (2019). The paper addresses the overview of the current humanitarian situation or key issues that needs to be solved.

Strassari, F., F. Zampagni. "Illicit firearms circulation and the politics of upheaval in North Africa." In Triggering Terror: Illicit Gun Markets and Firearms Acquisition of Terrorist Networks in Europe, ed. Nils Duquet (Project SAFTE), 435-461. Retrieved 8 January 2019 from:
https://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/safte/files/project_safte_eu_neighbourhood_north-africa.pdf

Although mentioned in the bibliography as well, the whole document provides a comprehensive insight into arms trade dynamics in the area.

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<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/tunisia-could-help-enforce-libyas-arms-embargo%EF%BB%BF/>

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from:<http://www.bradburys.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Conflict-analysis-of-the-Libyan-civil-war.pdf>

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Strassari, F., F. Zampagni. “Illicit firearms circulation and the politics of upheaval in North Africa.” In *Triggering Terror: Illicit Gun Markets and Firearms Acquisition of Terrorist Networks in Europe*, ed. Nils Duquet (Project SAFTE), 435-461. https://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/safte/files/project_safte_eu_neighbourhood_north-africa.pdf

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