



TEIMUN 2021

HISTORICAL UNSC

TOPIC: GEOPOLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE 1979 IRANIAN REVOLUTION

Welcome Letter

Dear delegates,

On behalf of The European International Model United Nations, we would like to welcome you to the Historic Security Council. We look forward to being your chairs and making this an experience worth remembering!

Participating as a delegate in TEIMUN will be a challenging, but definitely rewarding experience for you. We are certain that this Council will present opportunities for each and every delegate to learn, excel, and broaden their horizons. In and out of session, you will be pushed to consider innovative solutions to historic issues. Outside of the committee room, you will have the opportunity to interact while making friends from around the world.

For the Historic Security Council, we will ask you to look back for a little while. What if the events of 1980 had gone down differently? What if you had been a ruler of that time? As the potential leaders of the future, we ask you to reconsider the past. As philosopher George Santayana said: "Those who do not learn from the past are condemned to repeat it."¹ As such, we will be learning and experimenting with the past, to improve the future.

As your chairs we expect you, delegates of the Historic Security Council, to give your best effort while respecting the rules of procedure and your fellow delegates. We hope that TEIMUN will be an amazing experience for all of you, and that besides the challenging debates and having a blast, you will make connections and friends that will last for a lifetime. We are very much looking forward to meeting you in The Hague come July 2021!

Your chairs,

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¹Santayana, G. *The Life of Reason: Introduction, and Reason in Common Sense*. Creative Media Partners, LLC, 2016. <https://books.google.nl/books?id=d17cjwEACAAJ>.

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Letter of Invitation from the UN Secretariat



01-01-1980

Dear United Nations Security Council delegate,

In line with Article 35 of the UN charter, the United States of America has requested for the United Nations Security Council to convene in regards to the currently ongoing crisis in Tehran. This Council Meeting will convene on January 20th, 1980.

The United States of America requests this convening of the Security Council in a direct response to the hostage-taking of American diplomats and citizens, as well as the take-over of the U.S. embassy in Tehran.

In response, the United Nations requests that the Security Council investigates whether this might lead to international friction or a grander dispute, in order to be able to maintain international peace and security. Then, it requests that the Security Council act upon this discovery by adhering to either Article 41 or, if deemed necessary, Article 42 of the U.N. Charter.

We ask that the current members of the U.N. Security Council approach this manner in a collaborative, constructive manner, in order to ideally achieve a pacific settlement of the current dispute.

Yours sincerely,



Kurt Waldheim

Introduction to the United Nations Security Council

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the primary organs of the United Nations. The primary mandate or responsibility of the council can be summarized as maintaining international peace and security, developing friendly relations among nations, cooperating in solving international problems and being a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations.²

Normally, the UNSC consists of 15 countries with 5 permanent members having a veto power, called the P5 (United States, Russian Federation, People's Republic of China, Republic of France, and The United Kingdom) with the 10 other countries being voted into the council through the General Assembly. The Security Council is also allowed to invite non-members into discussions within the council as observers. Within this setting, observer countries are allowed to discuss and give their perspectives on various issues related to their reason of presence within the council, but are not given the right to vote in resolutions to reflect their observer status. These observers, however, are still allowed to vote on procedural matters such as motions. In this council, two observer states have been invited.

The non-permanent members of the UNSC are elected for a term of two years. Before their term elapses, a new election is called to the floor of the General assembly to vote for five new members who will replace the five members whose terms are elapsing, and so on. This is called the UNSC rotation rule, and each election traditionally rotates along regional blocks which consists of one seat for Latin America and Caribbean region, one seat for Africa, one for Asia-Pacific, and one for Western European and Others Group. However in this council, the regional blocks are being modified to make it more relevant to the debate.

To attain its purposes, the Security Council still primarily encourages the parties that have a claim regarding a threat to peace to solve the issue through peaceful means. In addition to the powers mentioned above, when hostilities break the Security Council still has the power to issue ceasefire directives and peacekeeping forces to help reduce tensions and calm situations where the parties involved may come to an agreement regarding the dispute. For extreme cases, the UNSC may also enact sanctions and even suggest a collective military intervention, all in an attempt to take decisive action and minimize the harmful impact of a heightened escalation.³

² "What Is the Security Council? Security Council." United Nations. United Nations. Accessed May 2021. <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/what-security-council>.

³ Ibid

Introduction to The Global Ramifications of the Iranian Revolution

The year is 1980. Starting from 1979, the country once known as Persia has now been ruled under a new regime. With it, comes a series of events that if not solved through peaceful means may result in an outbreak of war never before seen in the region. As time within the council progresses, various events will come up depending on the courses of debate and actions you delegates take.

Other than creating draft resolutions and its clauses, delegates may submit requests for press conferences that will be taken as action points for individual countries, joint actions, or actions of the council as a whole (See page 37-39 for further details). Unlike a crisis council, there will be no directive submissions, and the only tools available to solve an issue are the written clauses in the draft resolution, the added clause (See page 38 under "Crisis" section), and/or the aforementioned press conference. This document contains a series of important briefings related to the ramifications that delegates will need to further research upon to solve the issue, and it is divided into seven sections:

The First Section reveals the overall Timeline before the meeting begins. This section details general events happening around the world and the build-up to the meeting.

The Second Section contains basic information regarding Iran, from its geography, demographic, and economy to give additional context. Further research on this section is highly optional.

The Third Section delves deeper into the history of Iran, going back to the 18th Century, showing you how the seeds of revolution grew. The timeline format is used to highlight key developments surrounding the social and political events that led up to the moment the council session begins.

The Fourth Section outlines the events surrounding the hostage crisis. Delegates are open to frame their own narrative revolving around hostage taking, and as such are free to suggest various methods to solve the crisis, either through peaceful settlement of dispute or other means. Research upon hostage negotiation and or hostage taking operations are highly encouraged.

The Fifth Section gives insight upon a recent in-lore analyst report surrounding a possible conflict escalation between Iraq and Iran. As such, Research upon dispute settlement mechanisms is in order.

The Sixth and The Seventh Section contains additional information regarding the ongoing oil crisis and a briefing about the situation happening in Afghanistan to further give details to what's happening in the world. These issues are secondary to the agenda at hand, and there might be consequences if these are prioritized over the hostage situation.

Overall Timeline

This section will focus on the general timeline revolving in the Middle East and Central Asia, such as the Iranian Revolution and the Oil Crisis. Timelines focusing more on the hostage crisis are excluded from this section. For a hostage crisis timeline, see page 18.

1979:

Jan 1: An expectation of a decline in the production of gas has created a run-on gas to buy it while it's cheaper. This is reducing supply, a rise in gas prices, speculation on gas as a commodity, and it will spur inflation in energy importing countries.

Jan 16: The Shah and his family have left for Egypt. In Iran, streets are crowded with joyous people shouting "Shah raft, Shah raft!" (The Shah is gone).

January 20: One million Iranians march in Tehran in a show of support for the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini, fundamentalist Muslim leader.

Feb 1: In the spirit of a new freedom for Iran, Prime Minister Bakhtiar has allowed the Ayatollah Khomeini to return. Millions greet Khomeini, who calls for expelling all foreigners from Iran.

Feb 11: U.S. citizens who have been working in Iran begin to leave, joining many wealthy Iranians who for weeks have been emigrating.

February 12: Bakhtiar resigns as prime minister of Iran after losing support of the military.

Feb 14: In Kabul, Afghanistan, extremists kidnap and kill U.S. Ambassador Adolph Dubs.

Feb 22: The U.S. announces that its aid to Afghanistan will be drastically cut.

March 5: Iran resumes its oil exports to the U.S., ending its embargo and giving a boost to the oil production market.

Mar 10-20: Afghan army officers in the city of Herat attempt a mutiny and are crushed.

Mar 20: In Moscow, President Taraki of Afghanistan requests Soviet troops. He is told by Brezhnev that Soviet forces "would only play into the hands of our enemies both yours and ours." Brezhnev advises Taraki to go slow with social reforms and to seek broad support for his regime. He advises Taraki to remove Prime Minister Amin. He promises Taraki military equipment.

Apr 5: President Carter announces a plan for gradual decontrol of oil prices, and proposes a windfall profits tax to respond to growing energy shortages. The average price of crude oil increased to a high of \$15.85 per barrel.

June 26-28: OPEC raises oil prices average of 15 percent, effective July 1.

Jun 15: The U.S. has people bumper to bumper in long lines waiting to buy gas.

Jun 18: The Soviet Union's Leonid Brezhnev and U.S. President Carter sign the SALT II agreement in Vienna, an agreement to limit the number of missile launching facilities.

July 3: President Carter signs a directive for secret aid to the opponents of Afghanistan's government. His National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, tells Carter that this aid will induce a Soviet military intervention.

Jul 15: President Carter makes his so-called malaise speech in response to the question why the nation has been unable to resolve its energy problem by saying "What is lacking is confidence and a sense of community."

Jul 16: In Iraq, President Hasan al-Bakr resigns and is replaced by the acting president, Vice President Saddam Hussein.

Jul 17: Iraq's Saddam Hussein gives a speech praising the Iranian revolution and calling for an Iraq-Iranian friendship based on non-interference. However, Khomeini rejects said offer and calls for an "Islamic revolution in Iraq." This alarms Saddam Hussein of the Iranian threat and he prepares the military in response.

September 16: In Afghanistan, squabbling within the Taraki regime results in Taraki's death. Vice President Hafizullah Amin takes power.

October: Canada eliminates light crude oil exports to U.S. refiners, except for those exports required by operational constraints of pipelines.

Oct 6: The energy crisis continues. Inflation in the U.S. has been running at an annual rate of 10.75 percent, unprecedented for peacetime.

November 4: The U.S. has informed the Khomeini regime in Iran that the former Shah of Iran, Pahlavi, has come to the United States from Mexico to receive medical treatment. About 3,000 youthful Iranians invade the U.S. Embassy and take 53 Americans and others hostage. They are outraged over Pahlavi having entered the U.S., and they demand that the United States send Pahlavi to Iran to stand trial.

Nov 12: U.S. President Jimmy Carter orders cessation of Iranian imports to U.S.

Nov 12-14: President Carter applied economic and diplomatic pressure on Iran: oil imports from Iran are ended and through the issuance of Executive Order 12170, around US\$8 billion of Iranian assets in the U.S. were frozen by the Office of Foreign Assets Control on November 14.

Nov 15: Iran cancels all contracts with U.S. oil companies.

Nov 1-31: Afghans have been fleeing to Iran and Pakistan and organizing resistance against what they view as the "atheistic" and "infidel" Communist Amin regime. President Amin launches a successful military operation against anti-government forces in Paktria Province (next to Pakistan), obliterating a few villages. He also attempts to appease opinion by promising more religious freedom and to repair mosques. He begins distributing the Koran. He refers to Allah in his speeches and describes his revolution as "totally based on the principles of Islam."

Nov 20: Around 200 of religious extremist Juhayman ibn Muhammad ibn Sayf al-Otaibi's heavily armed Sunni followers take over the crowded Grand Mosque in Mecca, believing that with God they are overthrowing the Saudi government, which they believe to be corrupt and in league with the devil, his attempt was then thwarted.

Nov 21: The Carter administration suspects that the siege at Mecca is a creation of Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini. Iran's foreign ministry complains that "Zionist and U.S. circles" are associating the uprising with Iran. Then Khomeini accuses the U.S. and Israel of orchestrating what he describes as the despicable horrors at the Grand

Mosque at Mecca. A wave of anti-US demonstrations and attacks on U.S. embassies sweeps across the Muslim world.

Nov 21: Pakistani students, enraged by a radio report of Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini falsely claiming that the United States had bombed the Masjid al-Haram, Islam's holy site at Mecca, storm the U.S. embassy in Islamabad, burning it to the ground.

December 4: The Carter administration responds to anti-U.S. demonstrations and the siege at Mecca with a formulation that will be called the Carter Doctrine, intended to demonstrate U.S. strength and commitment to the defence of countries in the Persian Gulf region that are of "vital interest" to the United States. Within a few days U.S. negotiators fly to Oman to discuss establishing a military base. It is the beginning of an increased military presence in the Gulf region.

Dec 4: U.S. officials announce that the Soviet Union is giving low-key support to U.S. efforts to release the hostages in Iran.

Dec 10: In response to the siege at Mecca, the Carter administration dispatched the carrier U.S.S. Kitty Hawk and a battle group from the Philippines to the Persian Gulf. The Soviet military begins to assemble a force of 75,000 to 80,000 along the Afghan-Soviet border.

Dec 13: Saudi Arabia raises the benchmark crude price of oil to \$24 per barrel.

Dec 24: The Soviet Union begins sending troops into Afghanistan.

Dec 27: It is on this day in Afghanistan, Soviet KGB agents in Afghan uniforms storm the presidential palace and kill President Amin and around 200 of his guards. Earlier, Amin had lied about Taraki's cause of death back in September. Amin had carried out purges within the ruling political party, the PDPA (People Democratic Party of Afghanistan). The Soviet Union had been happy with Taraki and believed that Amin was responsible for having created instability. The Soviet government describes Amin as having been the head of "a bloody dynasty" and an agent of "United States imperialism."

Dec 29: Babrak Kamal, another member of the PDPA, who had been in safe exile as the ambassador to the Czech Republic, becomes President of Afghanistan.

Dec 31: President Carter tells ABC News that the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan has "made a more dramatic change in my own opinion of what the Soviets' ultimate goals are than anything they've done in the previous time I've been in office."

1980:

January 1: In Afghanistan, the Kamal regime declares that it invited Soviet troops into the country "in view of the present aggressive actions of the enemies of Afghanistan."

January 20: The UNSC convenes to discuss the ongoing situation in Iran.

General Demographics

Geography

Iran is a mountainous, ethnically diverse country in Southwest-Asia (see Fig. 1)⁴. While most of the country is higher than 1,500 feet, its center contains a desert plateau surrounded by high mountain ranges that only allow people to pass through mountain passes. Most of its population lives on the edges of this desert plateau.

Fig. 1. Map of Iran (Shaded Relief). Produced by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Co. (c1982).

From the University of Texas at Austin.

https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/iran_rel_1982.pdf



Iran is bordered to the North by Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkmenistan and the Caspian Sea, while to the East it borders Pakistan and Afghanistan. The South is taken up by the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, while the West borders Turkey and Iraq. Iran's capital city is Tehran, at the southern foot of the Elburz Mountain in the North of Iran, at the bottom of the Caspian Sea. With recent tensions, the city is falling increasingly into a state of disrepair. Still, the capital serves as a major centre of education, culture and commerce for Iran.

⁴ U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. "Map of Iran, Iran (Shaded Relief) 1982 (239K) and pdf format (247K)," c.1982, University of Texas at Austin, accessed May 4th, 2021. https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/iran_rel_1982.pdf

Iran is not a particularly dense country with 22.15 people per km², totalling a population of 38,650,243 in 1980. Persian (Farsi) is the predominant and official language of Iran. However, a number of languages and dialects with Indo-European, Altaic or Afro-Asiatic roots are also spoken frequently within the country.

Iran holds many nationalities and ethnic groups. It's Central Plateau houses Persians, Bakhiyaris, Qashqayis, Arabs, Baluchis etc. Additionally, Armenians, Assyrians, Turkomans, Timurs and other populations make up the rest of Iran's highly diverse population. The country's religious population is mostly divided between a Shi'i majority, a Sunni minority of Kurds, Turkomans, Arabs, and Baluchis and a non-Muslim population of Christians, Jews and Armenians.⁵⁶⁷ Due to the revolution, there was an outpour of highly educated workers. This flight of highly educated workers, physicians etc is estimated to constitute a loss of around \$30 to \$40 billions USD. Additionally, a migration of Afghan and Iraqi peoples to Iran has slowly started to increase, and Iran has one of the highest migrated populations on earth.

Economy

While Iran has historically been a rural and agricultural country, agricultural production has fallen since the 1960s from lack of adequate water distribution and poor soil, meaning Iran could in the future become a food importer instead of exporter. Currently, agricultural activities still account for about one-fifth of Iran's gross domestic product (GDP: 94.36 billion USD). By 1976, the average level of urbanization had grown to 46.8%.

Another important part of Iran's economy is its mining industry. In 1973, Iran arranged a 20-year oil agreement with a consortium of Western firms and gained control of Iranian oil fields to the government through the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). However, aware of the danger of depending on a diminishing oil asset, Iran started diversifying its economy through automobile production and structural steel production.

⁵ Abrahamian, Ervand. "The Causes of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 10, no. 3 (1979): 381-414. Accessed April 12, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/162146>.

⁶ Sanasarian, Eliz. *Religious Minorities in Iran*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Accessed April 12, 2021. ProQuest Ebook Central.

⁷ Asgharzadeh, Ailreza. *Iran and the Challenge of Diversity : Islamic Fundamentalism, Aryanist Racism, and Democratic Struggles*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2007. Accessed April 12, 2021. ProQuest Ebook Central.

Political Situation

This section gives historical background towards the current hostage crisis, and the context surrounding the Iranian revolution.

18th Century

Iran has never had a viable class system, depending on communal ties instead. Therefore, the Qajar dynasty was able to dominate society for a long time. After the Afghan invasion in 1722 and the collapse of the previous leadership, Persia entered a long period of political chaos. Many tribes fought to gain control over parts of Persia, resulting in the reign of Agha Muhammad Khan Qajar in 1789. Qajars had no military power, administrative stability and no ideological legitimacy to their people. In theory, the shahs were omnipotent; in practice, they were politically impotent.⁸

19th Century

By the end of the nineteenth century, the Qajar dynasty seemed to falter. The dominant rule had caused economic malaise (heavy inflation) and social unrest, as more people realized that the Qajar dynasty was more interested in strengthening the state against society than in protecting society itself. It came to a head when a group of “radical intellectuals” attempted to overthrow the financially bankrupt, morally discredited, ineffective and militarily weak despots.

20th Century

A series of protests in 1905 led to a short revolution in August 1906. Realizing their perilous position, the Moderates (propertied middle class) and Liberals (intelligentsia) managed to reform the constitution to include more power for the National Assembly as representation of the people. The executive power was still held by the shah, but they would be given their power by the People, not ordained by God.⁹ However, religion and religious leaders were still given a special place within the constitution.

Reza Shah's Rule

The subsequent Shah, Reza Shah, used the same tactics that the Qajar dynasty did, in setting up tribal communities against each other to keep power but also created a strong army, a modern bureaucracy and extensive court patronage. By 1914, as British and Russian authorities became heavily involved in the country, many of its

⁸ Abrahamian, Ervand. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982. <https://hdl-handle-net.tilburguniversity.idm.oclc.org/2027/heb.00853>. EPUB

⁹ Ibid.

people had resigned themselves to foreign interventions. However, Reza Shah started a campaign against foreign influences by annulling treaties granting extraterritorial jurisdiction to several European nations, while also installing Western-inspired in place of Islamic ones, like forbidding Islamic clothing and the veiling of women. Since neither Islamic people nor the foreign influencers wanted Reza Shah in power, he was deposed in 1941 by allied British and Soviet troops, who then installed Reza's son, Prince Reza Pahlavi.

Khomeini's Ideologies

In 1963, Shia cleric Ayatollah Khomeini came to the forefront of Persian prominence, as he led opposition to the Shah, who had in his eyes allowed too much Western influence by contaminating Persia's Ideology with liberalism, nationalism and socialism from international influences. He denounced the Shah, and started a riot resulting in many deaths. He denounced the Shah and was sent into exile until 1978. In 1972, Khomeini warned that Persia's problems would not be solved if "the nation of Islam" remained attached to "these colonial schools of thought".¹⁰

Shah Pahlavi Takes Over the Reign

In 1975, Shah Pahlavi dissolved the two existing political parties, creating the Resurgence Party and creating a one-party state, designed to transform the military dictatorship into a totalitarian-style one-party state.¹¹ Opposing artists, writers and filmmakers were jailed, state corporations that directly threatened the economic basis of Iran's population were created and the Shah was declared as a spiritual leader in Islam in an attempt to nationalize religion. Under Shah Pahlavi's rule, the ranks of the modern middle class and industrial working class grew, while the disconnect between the political establishment and the general population grew as well. By 1977 this disconnect was enough to bring about more riots.

The Conflict Erupts

Until November 1977, not many of the protests were outside of people's own homes, until students started to organize peaceful poetry-reading sessions which led to an ensuing clash with police, one was killed, seventy were wounded and hundred students were arrested. After some theology students demanded the return of Khomeini and the protests were struck down with violence, Khomeini

¹⁰ Arjomand, Said Amir. "Constitution-Making in Islamic Iran: The Impact of Theocracy on the Legal Order of a Nation-State." In *History and Power in the Study of Law: New Directions in Legal Anthropology*, edited by Starr June and Collier Jane F., 113-28. Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1989. Accessed May 4, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt207g6xn.9>. Page 119.

¹¹ Abrahamian, Ervand. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982. <https://hdl-handle-net.tilburguniversity.idm.oclc.org/2027/heb.00853>. EPUB. Page 440.

responded by calling for more protests and accused the Shah of collaborating with the U.S. to undermine Islam and prime it for foreign influences. Subsequently, came several months of protests. In response, the Shah attempted to seem more Islamic, slowed down the spiralling costs of living and physically intimidated the leaders of the secular opposition. In the middle of 1978, the working class joined the protests, growing the protests from thousands to millions. The Shah responded by saying the "welfare state" had covered the workers with "soft wool," resulting in more demonstrations and several take-overs of cities.

On September 7th, the Shah forced the cabinet to decree martial law in several cities that were often the site of demonstrations, causing the inevitable confrontations to occur in the morning of September 8th. Although the true number of casualties is unknown, September 8th is known as Black Friday, enflaming public emotions and furthering the population's hatred of the Shah, who did not know how to deal with the worsening crisis. He moved from one extreme position to another, ranging from martial law and army interventions, to amnestying 1,126 political prisoners and ending press censorship.

The Beginning of The End

Soldiers and police started joining the demonstrators, while the U.S. started to slow down its support for the standing regime. Just before 1979, the Shah appointed Bakhtiyar as prime minister, who sent Shah Pahlavi on "vacation" to Europe. Bakhtiyar started to reform Iran immediately, while warning that if the opposition sabotaged his efforts to create a constitutional government, the army would establish a brutally repressive military dictatorship. Meanwhile, Khomeini warned to not obey a government appointed by the evil Shah. On February 1st he returned to Iran, taking personal command of the revolution he started. Finally, after sixteen months of demonstrations, and five months of strikes the Pahlavi state collapsed.

Creation of Islamic Republic

The collapse is seen as the end of the Iranian revolution. April saw a referendum on whether Iran should become an "Islamic Republic," passing with 98,2% of all votes. In December of 1979, Iran's constitution was approved as an Islamic theocracy headed by Supreme Leader Khomeini. It holds both an elected president and elected governmental bodies at the national, provincial and local level¹², with elements of

¹² Arjomand, Said Amir. "Constitution-Making in Islamic Iran: The Impact of Theocracy on the Legal Order of a Nation-State." In *History and Power in the Study of Law: New Directions in Legal Anthropology*, edited by Starr June and Collier Jane F., 113-28. Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1989. Accessed May 4, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt207g6xn.9>.

both a theocratic and democratic form of government, giving sovereignty to God, while also establishing popular elections for the presidency and parliament, which both remain subordinate to the Guardian Council and Supreme Leader.¹³

¹³ Abrahamian, Ervand. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982. <https://hdl-handle-net.tilburguniversity.idm.oclc.org/2027/heb.00853>. EPUB.

Iranian Hostage Crisis

This section of the study guide will focus on the hostage crisis currently ongoing. Presented below is a timeline and a description of the events that have passed since 1979.

January 12: In Paris, Ayatollah Khomeini forms the Revolutionary Council.

Jan 16: Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi leaves Iran for exile to Egypt.

February 1: Ayatollah Khomeini returns to Iran from France after his exile and is greeted by millions of people in the streets of Tehran.

Feb 14: The U.S. Embassy in Tehran is attacked by crowds and embassy staff initially surrender, but the protestors were ousted on the order of Iran's acting Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi.

May 5: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is established by a decree issued by Khomeini.

October 22: Shah Pahlavi arrives in the United States for cancer treatment. Khomeini condemns the U.S. for allowing the deposed Shah entry into the country.

November 4: Student protestors overrun the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, seizing its personnel as hostages. About ninety people are taken hostage of which 66 are American.

Nov 5: Iranian government cancels all defense treaties with the United States and the Soviet Union.

Nov 6: Iranian Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan's cabinet resigns. Iran is ruled by the Revolutionary Guards under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

Nov 7: U.S. President Jimmy Carter sends emissaries, Ramsey Clark and William Miller to Iran to negotiate the release of the hostages, but they are refused entry.

Nov 12: Iranian Foreign Minister Abolhassan Banisadr says the hostages will be released if the U.S. deports the Shah back to Iran.

Nov 14: U.S. Government freezes all the property and interests of the government of Iran and the Central Bank of Iran in the U.S.

Nov 19-20: 5 female and 8 African-American hostages are released in a unilateral Iranian gesture.

Nov 29: The U.S. sues Iran in the International Court of Justice for violating international law.

December 4: The United Nations Security Council passes a resolution calling for Iran to release the hostages.

Dec 15: Shah Pahlavi leaves the United States for Panama.

Start of Crisis

Since the discovery of oil in Iran in the first decade of the twentieth century, the nation has piqued Western interest. By the early 1950s, when newly elected Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadegh announced plans to nationalize the country's oil industry, British companies owned the majority of Iran's petroleum. Concerned that Mossadegh was bringing Iran closer to the Soviet Union, the CIA and British intelligence plotted to depose Mossadegh and consolidate power under a leader more open to Western interests during the Cold War.¹⁴

Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, a member of Iran's royal family, was elected as the country's leader in 1953. Approximately 80% of the country's oil reserves were restored to US and British control under the Shah's pro-Western, liberal anti-communist regime. The Shah and his secret police, SAVAK, violently suppressed resistance to his rule, including an uprising led by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, an elderly Islamic cleric, in 1963, with a steady supply of American-made weapons.

The Revolution

In 1979, the Shah was deposed by a popular uprising in Iran and was replaced by an Islamist government led by Khomeini, who returned triumphantly after 14 years in exile to take his rightful position as Iran's political and religious leader. Against the advice of some of his advisors, US President Jimmy Carter refused to act in favor of the Shah, but he also neglected to reach out to the opposition, a move that would cost him dearly. Carter reluctantly agreed to let the Shah, who was now in exile in Mexico, enter the United States for treatment on humanitarian grounds after it was revealed that he was suffering from an advanced type of cancer.¹⁵

¹⁴ History.com Editors. "Iran Hostage Crisis." History.com. A&E Television Networks, June 1, 2010. <https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/iran-hostage-crisis>.

¹⁵ Pruitt, Sarah. "What Led to the Iran Hostage Crisis?" History.com. A&E Television Networks, November 4, 2014. <https://www.history.com/news/background-to-the-iran-hostage-crisis>.

The Hostage Taking

The crisis started on November 4, 1979, when militant Iranian students occupied the US embassy in Tehran, enraged that the US government had permitted the exiled shah of Iran to fly to New York City for medical care. Even after the United Nations Security Council ordered an end to the crisis in a majority vote, Iran's political and religious leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, took control of the hostage situation, denying all appeals to free the hostages. The embassy hostages were held prisoner for long periods of time, subjected to beatings, threats of bodily harm, and execution and their captors refused them hot and cold running water until days before their liberation, among other items.

Two weeks after the embassy was stormed, the Ayatollah started releasing all non-US hostages, as well as all female and minority Americans, citing these groups as citizens marginalised by the US government. Over the next 14 months, the remaining 52 prisoners were at the mercy of the Ayatollah.

For the first time, the Iran hostage crisis took the US into direct confrontation with the revolutionary and belligerent Iranian state. Last year on the 31st of December, the Security Council already adopted Resolution 461, in which it reiterated the decision made by the International Court of Justice to release the hostages.¹⁶

Fig 2. Photo Outside of American Embassy in Tehran, hostages are still inside. Photo taken by Associated press¹⁷



¹⁶ UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 457 (1979) [Islamic Republic of Iran-USA], 4 December 1979, S/RES/457 (1979), available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f1678.html>

¹⁷ Hill, Shoun. "Iran Hostage Crisis Ended 40 Years Ago." AP Images Spotlight. AP Images Spotlight, January 20, 2021. <https://apimagesblog.com/historical/2021/1/13/iran-hostage-crisis-ended-40-years-ago>.

Few weeks has passed since the adoption of resolution 461, and now The UNSC is again being called to solve the crisis, or else the repercussions may invite retaliation that will affect the region as a whole. New reports are also coming from various analysts raising alarm about another crisis coming from neighboring Iraq, but conclusive findings are awaiting further developments.

Black Gold Red Sands: Possible Conflict Escalation

As the situation with the hostage crisis is developing, decade long disputes may lead to an outbreak of war. This section will discuss the possible escalation between Iraq and Iran, in which delegates will need to address to maintain peace and stability in the region.

The Rise of Iraq

To the west of Iran, lies the Republic of Iraq. Like other countries in the region, the country emerged from their independence while experiencing a period of political transition from colonial rule to their own political system. The rise of Gamal Abdul Nasser in Egypt gave credence to the idea of a united Arab- which then morphed into Ba'athism in other areas of The Levant.¹⁸ In contrast to the Iranian protests which were sparked by protests against government's ineptitude and perceived corrupt rule, the Baathist revolution in Iraq back in 1968 started and ended in a relatively calm manner. This came after a short five-year rule under a group of military cliques.¹⁹ In July 1968, the Ba'ath party led by Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein alongside military officers launched another coup that put the party in power. This, however, was followed up by a regime of oppression against ethnic and religious minorities that the Ba'athist government sees as being prone to separatism and insubordination.²⁰ For the next twelve years, Iraq under Ba'ath was active in regional affairs and started to take notice of their own geopolitical position, especially their relations with Iran. With the new regime in Iran taking power, analysts predicted that it will be possible for the two powers to be at odds with each other.

Iraq itself was an active player in the regional sphere. During the Six Days War between Israel and its neighbour, the country participated in the campaign indirectly. Their most notable contribution however, can be seen during the 1973 Yom Kippur war, where the country agreed to assist by sending an armored division and support elements to help with the war effort. Their forces then helped the Syrian armed forces to defend the Golan Heights from the advancing Israelis.²¹ There are several

¹⁸ L, Cabana Joel. "The Ba'th Party in Iraq: from Its Beginning through Today." Institutional Archive of the Naval Post Graduate School , December 1993.

<https://doi.org/https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/36732021.pdf>.

¹⁹ Galvani, John. "The Baathi Revolution in Iraq." MERIP Reports, no. 12 (1972): 3-22. Accessed May, 2021. doi:10.2307/3012223.

²⁰ Disney , Donald Bruce Jr. "The Kurdish Nationalist Movement and External Influences." Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive, n.d. <https://doi.org/https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/36710864.pdf>.

²¹ O'Ballance, Edgar. No Victor, No Vanquished: the Yom Kippur War. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1991.

rationales behind their involvement in the conflict. First, is the need of the country to show the image of strength and willingness to cooperate with its neighbour.²² Despite having one of the strongest military in the region, the government of Iraq sees their territory as being threatened by separatists forces. One of the cases is the decade-long Aylul revolt that went between 1961 to 1970. Having been promised regional autonomy on the onset of the Qasim administration, the Kurdish population revolted and launched a campaign for their rights. This was followed by Iraqi brutal military campaign to subdue the revolts.²³ The revolt ended with the Iraqi–Kurdish Autonomy Agreement of 1970, which promised an autonomous region to be set up for Iraqi Kurdish population. However, as negotiations failed, hostilities resumed in 1974 led by Mustafa Barzani.

The Involvement of Iran

During the revolt, the Shah of Iran openly supported the Kurdish forces and thus triggered the fear within the Iraqi administration and general staff that the Iranian wants to weaken the country for a possible confrontation. Wanting the support to end, Iraq and Iran struck an agreement under the 1975 Algiers treaty to settle border disputes, and both parties ratified the treaty, making it binding under international law.²⁴ The agreement resulted in both Iraq and Iran sharing the border to the middle of the river or the Thalweg. In the end, Iran withdrew its support to the Kurdish forces, and the forces surrendered. Following their victory, the Iraqi continued their Arabization program and pacification campaigns all the way to the end of the decade which resulted in around thousands of Kurds being displaced and hundreds of villages burned to the ground.²⁵

The second purpose behind their involvement is the fear of Iran especially during the rule under the Shah. In 1971, the Iranian bought new military equipment from the United States. In addition, the regime took over three islands that are vital to the Strait of Hormuz, that are the islands of Abu Musa, and Greater and Lesser Tunbs.²⁶ These islands, sitting right on the straits of Hormuz, provided fear to the Iraqi administration as to if there is any potential conflict that rose between the two

²² W. Andrew Terrill (2000) Iraq's role in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 11:3, 1-20, DOI: [10.1080/09592310008423287](https://doi.org/10.1080/09592310008423287)

²³ Tyner, Richard. "Book Review: Edgar O'Ballance, *The Kurdish Revolt: 1961-1970*. (Faber & Faber, 1973, £2.95)." *Millennium* 3, no. 1 (March 1974): 87–89. <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298740030010803>.

²⁴ Koç, Engin. (2018). 1975 Algiers Agreement.

²⁵ CFR "Timeline: The Kurds' Quest for Independence." Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed April 2021. <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/kurds-quest-independence>.

²⁶ Banaszewska, Dorota. (2018). *The Legal Status of Greater and Lesser Tunbs Islands Including a Brief History of the Legal Dispute*. 10.1007/978-3-319-72718-9_6.

countries, there is a possibility that the islands will be used to block Iraq access from the sea, thus blocking the country from exporting and importing goods thus crippling their economy. As such, it is within the Iraqi interest to show a force of strength. Right after the islands were seized, Iraq broke diplomatic relations with Iran. This was followed by the aforementioned series of conflicts and proxy support of Iran towards revolts and unrest within Iraq.

Points of Contention

Despite the seemingly cordial relations between Iraq and the new Iranian government after the revolution, the recent developments based on geographical dispute might cause conflict. This is due to two main reasons. First, is the need of the new Iranian government to gain political legitimacy amongst their populace, if we reflect on the current ongoing hostage crisis.²⁷ Second, is the possibility of renewed conflict due to the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Despite the existence of the Algiers agreement, either Iraq or Iran could press their claim and treat the treaty as void, especially seeing the treaty being humiliating to Iraq. In regards to the first concerns, there have been reports from Iran that the leader of the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini is calling for the same Islamic revolution to occur in Iraq and topple the Ba'athist regime- this happened despite the call for peace that comes from the Iraqi side.²⁸ As such, it is worthwhile to take a deeper look into territorial disputes between these two states to maintain regional stability.



Fig 3. Drawing of Iran-Iraq Boundary in Shatt al-Arab by Office of the Geographer U.S Department of State¹

²⁷ D. Ray Heisey & J. David Trebing (1986) Authority and legitimacy: A rhetorical case study of the Iranian revolution, *Communication Monographs*, 53:4, 295-310, DOI: [10.1080/03637758609376145](https://doi.org/10.1080/03637758609376145)

²⁸ Riedel, Bruce. "What Iran's Revolution Meant for Iraq." Brookings. Brookings, January 24, 2019. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/24/what-irans-revolution-meant-for-iraq/>.

Based on the map, we could see that the 1975 Shatt al-Arab waterway treaty went slightly in the favour of the Iranian before the revolution as it put the border right on the middle of the river, giving limited access to Iraq and giving Iran room for manoeuvre in and out of ports without toll to Iraq. To solve the dispute might provide us with the key to solving a possible diplomatic crisis between these two countries. There have been previous treaties that try to manage the waterway, however, there are contentious disagreements especially on how to divide the important landmark.

On one side, the Iraqi demanded the waterway to be wholly given to Iraq. The argument used behind this is using the equitable principle. Seeing that the only water access to the sea is through the waterway, while Iran already has coastlines that are much bigger than Iraq's, giving the waterway to Iraq would only be equitable.²⁹ In addition to that, as one of the legitimate successors to the Ottoman state, the country should have inherited all the water treaties that were made during the Ottoman era and the British rule. In the 1937 water treaty, the division made was the waterway was divided alongside the low watermark for the river, but at the mouth of the river the border is at the thalweg or the deeper line of the river. As such, port access to two regions- Abadan and Khorramshahr are blocked. This caused Iraq to have full control of the river and Iran had to pay the toll every time the ship passed to port.³⁰ As Shah Reza Pahlavi wanted to further legitimize his rule through strength, Iran confronted Iraq over the waterways and as such unilaterally declared the treaty as void under the principle of *rebus sic stantibus* due to the lack of consent as during the signing of the treaty the Iranian was seen as forced to sign it by the British that ruled over Iraq.³¹ The discussions regarding the border became a sensitive issue and relations between both sides only got better after the signing of the 1975 Algiers treaty.

Analysts have suggested that the treaty only provides temporary measures. Control of the Shatt al-Arab is crucial for both powers, as for Iraq, it arguably provides the only way for the country to deliver its oil exports down the river.³² Meanwhile for Iran, the ceding of the river boundaries to Iran as shown by the 1937 treaty will impact the productivity and the oil exports from one of its most productive oil

²⁹ Melamid, Alexander. "The Shatt Al-'Arab Boundary Dispute." *Middle East Journal* 22, no. 3 (1968): 350-57. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4324304>.

³⁰ *Ibid*

³¹ Joseph J. Cusimano, *Analysis of Iran-Iraq Bilateral Border Treaties*, 24 *Case W. Res. J. Int'l L.* 89 (1992)

Available at: <https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol24/iss1/4>

³² Schofield R. (2004) *Position, Function, and Symbol: The Shatt al-Arab Dispute in Perspective*. In: Potter L.G., Sick G.G. (eds) *Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403980427_3

regions- not to mention any toll will directly enrich Iraq. Furthermore, the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs are still under Iranian control after the Shah's regime's successful attempt at annexing these islands. Due to its strategic location, even if any dispute settlement mechanism resulted in the waterway being completely under Iraqi control, Iran would still have control over the ship traffic lane that went in and out of the Persian Gulf.


Following up on the Chapter VI of the UN Charter, that is the pacific settlement of dispute, if negotiation failed then mediation and or arbitration might provide a way out for consenting parties. Furthermore, documents such as The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers might also provide guidelines on solving the dispute.³³ But even if this issue is settled, then the council must find a way to de-escalate and rebuild trust amongst the conflicting parties.

³³ Fry, James D., and Agnes Chong. "UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES ." International Law Journal Georgetown, n.d. <https://www.law.georgetown.edu/international-law-journal/wp-content/uploads/sites/21/2019/10/GT-GJIL190029.pdf>.

Oil Shocks: Lessons From 1973 Oil Crisis

Oil is one of the most important commodities in the world. Since the 1950's, major oil producers around the globe have tried to form a standard of oil prices. Arrangements were made, and in 1960, five states (Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela) formed the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).³⁴ One of the primary causes for the creation of the organization is the action conducted by Multinational Oil Companies in reducing oil prices in Venezuela and Middle East by up to 10%. Due to the abrupt change in prices, ministers of the aforementioned countries decided to conduct an annual review on the selling price of oil, limiting the price and thus dictating on the selling of the commodity.³⁵

Fig 4. Global Oil Prices 1973-1980 Data by Macrotrends³⁶



Impact Oil Crisis

In 1973, A war occurred between Israel, Egypt, and Syria, dubbed the Yom Kippur war. During the conflict, the United States and various other European powers allied to the United States and Israel decided to intervene by assisting Israel through provisions of military equipment. The Soviet Union in return, also supplied the Arabs with their own respective provisions. As a response, countries that fall under the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) decided to embargo

³⁴ OPEC "Brief History." OPEC. Accessed May 2021.

https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/24.htm.

³⁵ John, Emmanuel. (2018). OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries).

³⁶ MacroTrends "Crude Oil Prices - 70 Year Historical Chart." MacroTrends. Accessed May 2021. <https://www.macrotrends.net/1369/crude-oil-price-history-chart>.

parties that are supporting Israel. As a result, the price of oil globally increased from a mere \$3 per barrel into up to \$12.³⁷ This sharp increase in oil price resulted in several issues. First, is the nationalization by oil producers. Seeing the benefit of oil production and export, various countries started to rely more upon the natural resources as the cornerstone of their Gross Domestic Product. This over reliance drove the countries in question into further centralization of power.³⁸

Total GNP, Exports, Imports, and Account Balance of Iraq Oil Market
1970-1979 (in \$ Million)

Year	GNP at Market	Exports (Total)	Value of Oil Exports	Non-Oil Exports	Imports	Account Balance
1970	3,038.9	847	784	63	508	100
1971	3,413.3	1,139	1,062	77	702	194
1972	3,748.2	1,108	953	155	705	545
1973	5,107.1	1,955	1,836	119	905	811
1974	10,619.7	6,601	6,505	96	2,364	2,856
1975	13,232.0	8,297	8,176	121	4,214	2,971
1976	16,040.0	8,272	9,114	158	3,471	2,627
1977	18,473.4	9,649	9,505	144	3,899	3,023
1978	22,584.5	11,061	10,850	211	4,213	3,254
1979	34,180.0	21,432	21,289	143	7,006	10,823

Tab.1 The Share of Oil in Iraqi Economy 1970-1979, Processed From OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 1982³⁹

Following upon this premise, the second key issue that is important to the topic is the social implications of the boom. Due to the success of oil exports, there is a

³⁷ Burt, Michael. "Was the 'Oil Weapon' Effective in Achieving the Arab States' Goals in 1973-74?" E, December 29, 2014. <https://www.e-ir.info/2014/12/28/was-the-oil-weapon-effective-in-achieving-the-arab-states-goals-in-1973-74/>.

³⁸ Ikenberry, G. John. "The Oil Shocks and State Responses." In *Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government*, 1-20. Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1988. Accessed May, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt207g7cv.4>.


³⁹ OPEC "Annual Statistical Bulletin." OPEC. Accessed May 2021. https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/publications/202.htm.

linkage of wealth inequality and an increase of military spending especially in countries with authoritarian tendencies.⁴⁰ This resulted in an ever growing trend of hawkish rhetorics. With the building up of the military amongst countries, the issue of security dilemma, in which states in the region seeing that their neighbors ramping up their military spending, opted to also increase their own spending which caused a cycle.⁴¹ If left unchecked, this dilemma may cause states in the region to distrust each other, and thus making any attempt to solve disputes difficult. To address this, efforts must be made to either curtail the spending or to build essential confidence in order to provide assurances of peace.

Threat to Oil Supply Chain: Tanker War

With tensions currently rising, the understanding of what's at stake in the region is in order. The region is one of the major producers of oil in the world, and Strait of Hormuz holds one of the world's busiest oil transport lanes. In addition, a conflict between two players in the region may cause a spillover effect that resulted in other actors being involved. Analysts suggested that an outbreak of conflict, actors involved will try to sabotage the export of oil belonging to another party, or tanker war.⁴²

Fig. 5 Iranian and Iraqi Tanker Route⁴³ Source: Wikimedia Commons



⁴⁰ Issawi, Charles. "Oil and Middle East Politics." *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 31, no. 2 (1973): 111-22. Accessed May 3, 2021. doi:10.2307/1173574.

⁴¹ Shiping Tang (2009) *The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis*, *Security Studies*, 18:3, 587-623, DOI: 10.1080/09636410903133050

⁴² Hooton, E., and Martin S. Navias. *Tanker Wars: Assault on Merchant Shipping During the Iran-Iraq Crisis, 1980-88*, n.d.

⁴³ Wikimedia. "Wikimedia Tanker War Map," n.d.

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tanker_War_map_-_The_Iran-Iraq_War_1980_-_1988.jpg.

Falling under the category of security risks, there are three key issues that might be raised as a result of a possible conflict. First is the threat posed to shipping in the region. Note that sharing 20% of the share of oil traffic, the region holds a significant amount of oil exports not only from Iran and Iraq but also from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and also The UAE. In addition, international cargo ships, not only oil carriers, are also using the lanes every day. If left unchecked, parties might also target these shipping vessels in order to cripple the others, and if the ship belongs to an outside party, an intervention may result in conflict escalating from a regional one into an international one. The Second issue is the question of the economic repercussions. As both powers are oil producers, an attempt could be made by one of the parties to flood the market with oil, by increasing their oil production. This will cause the oil price to go down, and as such, weakening other countries that use oil as the primary export. This again, may result in an unwanted intervention that will entangle the conflict even further, as parties with oil producers want the conflict to finish as soon as possible. The third issue is the question of legality, to what extent international shipping is protected under the rule of just war, and how to better protect such ships from attacks by any parties involved in a conflict. Of course, these questions could be answered if prior issues are settled, but as the clock ticks, the chance of de-escalation is improbable.

The Situation in Afghanistan

The Islamic Republic of Iran has not been particularly warm towards the Soviet Union (USSR). Nevertheless, the USSR has far greater potential than the United States to serve as a valuable friend, or at least acquaintance, as Iran works to define its new global position. While both sides have reason to be wary of growing too close, their relationship since the fall of the Shah points to opportunities that might outweigh the associated risks.

Analysts predict the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 will be recognized as one of the pivotal moments in the Cold War, yet the circumstances surrounding this event have remained murky ever since they took place. In December 1979, in the midst of the Cold War, the Soviet 40th Army invaded Afghanistan in order to prop up the communist government of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) against a growing insurgency. At the time, other powers such as the United States had been making headway in the Middle East at Moscow's expense, successfully courting Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and others. The Soviet Union feared the loss of its communist proxy in Afghanistan.⁴⁴

Protective of its borders, the Soviet Union is concerned about the growth of Islamism and terrorism in its traditional sphere of influence or "near abroad"—the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.⁴⁵ Many militants from these areas have significant ties to the various Soviet Republics in Central Asia, and therefore the Soviet Union does not want to see an Islamist in Kabul or a failed state emerge in Afghanistan, or else separatism of the Central Asian republics might threaten the break-up of the Union. While the Kremlin may disapprove of NATO's presence along its southern frontier, it does not want to see Afghanistan become a safe haven for a separatist, terrorist, or Islamist forces.⁴⁶

Simultaneously, these interests were undoubtedly advanced in the initial phase of the Islamic Revolution, which provided a boon to the USSR by eliminating almost all of the sources of its tension with -Western rhetoric was matched in his policies, which quickly eliminated US intelligence bases in Iran, ended Iranian cooperation with the Western world, and, at least temporarily, permitted the return of the long-suppressed Communist Tudeh Party.

⁴⁴ Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy, "Inside the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the Seizure of Kabul," *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars* 51 (2007): pp. 3.

⁴⁵ Institute for the Study of War "Russia and Afghanistan." Institute for the Study of War. Accessed May 2021. <http://www.understandingwar.org/russia-and-afghanistan>.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*

Past Resolutions

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations

The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which has been in effect since 1967, is an international treaty that establishes a structure for consular relations between sovereign states. Consuls have historically been employed to represent the interests of countries or their citizens in another country's embassy or consulate. The Convention specifies and articulates the roles, privileges, and immunities bestowed on consular officers and their offices, as well as the rights and responsibilities of "receiving States" (where the consul is based) and "sending States" (the state the consul represents).⁴⁷

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 is an international treaty that establishes a structure for diplomatic relations between nations. It defines a diplomatic mission's privileges, which enable diplomats to carry out their duties without fear of intimidation or abuse from the host country. The legal rationale for diplomatic immunity is based on this. Its articles are regarded as foundational in the field of modern international relations.⁴⁸

UN Security Council S/RES/457

This resolution from Dec. 4, 1979, called on Iran to immediately release hostages held at the American embassy in Tehran and allow them to leave the country after expressing concern about the level of tensions between Iran and the US as a possible threat to international security. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which urged countries to respect the inviolability of diplomatic staff and the premises of their diplomatic missions, were both referred to in the resolution.⁴⁹

UN Security Council S/RES/461

Adopted on 31 December 1979, this resolution expressed concern about the growing tensions between Iran and the United States, and criticised Iran for holding American hostages at the US embassy in Tehran and quoted the International Court

⁴⁷ "Vienna Convention on Consular Relations."

https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963.pdf, n.d.

⁴⁸ "Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations."

https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf, n.d.

⁴⁹ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. "Security Council Resolution 457 (1979) [Islamic Republic of Iran-USA]." Refworld. Accessed May 2, 2021.

<https://www.refworld.org/publisher,UNSC,RESOLUTION,IRN,3b00f1678,0.html>.

of Justice's order that the hostages be released immediately and without conditions. Member States were warned against threats and the use of force in foreign affairs, and the resolution demanded that the American hostages be released and allowed to leave the country once more.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ ———. "Security Council Resolution 461 (1979) [Islamic Republic of Iran-USA]." Refworld. Accessed May 2, 2021.
<https://www.refworld.org/publisher,UNSC,RESOLUTION,IRN,3b00f1777f,0.html>.

QARMAS

1. How should the UNSC act in order to solve the hostage situation?
 - a. Which are the parties responsible for the hostage situation? How should the international community address these parties, once identified?
 - b. What are measures that can be implemented to ensure the neutrality and safety of embassies in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Consular relations?

2. What steps are needed to prevent conflict escalation in the region?
 - a. Are the current steps of conflict prevention sufficient, especially concerning foreign influences in conflicts?
 - b. If these steps remain unchanged, what does the UNSC need to change in practical implication to improve conflict resolution?

3. How can the UNSC mitigate rising issues such as economic consequences of conflict, abuses of human rights, and violation of international treaties in accordance with the UNSC mandate?

Sources For Further Research

The following sources might be helpful in your preparation, but are not mandatory to study.

UN Security Council S/RES/479

This resolution did not occur in the council yet, as it was adopted in September of 1980, but could be used as a template or inspiration for this council. It emphasized that Iran and Iraq immediately cease any further use of force and instead resolve their conflict through negotiations. It encouraged both countries to consider any suitable offer of mediation, while also encouraging other Member States to refrain from actions that could escalate regional tensions.⁵¹ Note: DO NOT COPY (parts of) this resolution, merely use it as inspiration.

UN Security Council S/RES/514

This resolution that did not occur in the council yet, as it was adopted in July of 1982, could be used as a template or inspiration for this council. This resolution called for a cease-fire between the two countries and a withdrawal to their internationally recognised borders. It also requested Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar to keep working on the mediation and report back to the Council within three months on any efforts to bring the resolution into effect.⁵² Note: DO NOT COPY (parts of) this resolution, merely use it as inspiration.

Last, David. 1999. 'From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding: Theory, Cases, Experiments and Solutions'.

This paper discusses peacekeeping and peacebuilding theories, past cases, experiments and solutions that might be useful to those attempting to maintain or build peace, like the mandate of the Security Council describes.

⁵¹ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. "Security Council Resolution 479 (1980) [Iraq-Islamic Republic of Iran]." Refworld. Accessed May 2, 2021.

<https://www.refworld.org/publisher,UNSC,RESOLUTION,IRN,3b00f17344,0.html>.

⁵² United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. "Security Council Resolution 514 (1982) [Iraq-Islamic Republic of Iran]." Refworld. Accessed May 2, 2021.

<https://www.refworld.org/publisher,UNSC,RESOLUTION,IRN,3b00f1705f,0.html>.

Gerald T. McLaughlin and Ludwik A. Teklaff, The Iranian Hostage Agreements: A Legal Analysis , 4 Fordham Int'l L.J. 223 (1980).

This legal analysis from 1980 (after the start of the council, so be aware that not everything mentioned in this analysis will have occurred yet, and these things might not occur at all) discusses the legal internal and external debates surrounding the Iranian revolution and Hostage Crisis.

444 Days to Freedom, What Really Happened in Iran - The Inside Story

This documentary chronicles the Iran Hostage Crisis from the hostage's point of view, using interviews with former hostages and footage shot by Iranian students and the Iran government. Note: This documentary references events happening after the start of the council, which should be disregarded as they might not occur in this council.

Analysis of Iran-Iraq Bilateral Border Treaties

This international law journal written by Joseph J. Cusimano provided excellent details on the timeline and also the legal aspects being used revolving around the Shatt-Al-Arab river. The treaties analysed within the journal ranges from The Ottoman Empire and Persia until the latest relevant treaty that is the 1975 Algiers treaty.

UN Security Council Resolution of International Water Disputes

Article written by James D. Fry and Agnes Chong which identify and analyze various ways in which the United Nations Security Council resolves water disputes. The article also contains several key principles and crucial insights on the norms present during the time span of the conference (until 1980).

Contemporary Conflict Resolution

An excellent book written by Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse which discusses the process of preventing, managing, and transforming deadly conflict. Chapter 4 is recommended as it analyzes recent conflict prevention cases that can be useful if implemented retrospectively.

Council Mechanics

The observing countries will be able to be involved in the discussion, vote on procedural votes and the creation of various documents (working papers, draft resolutions, and press releases), however they will not have substantive voting rights.

The Press Conference

1. General definition:
 - a. The delegates can request to hold a press conference during an unmoderated caucus.
 - a. The time of the press conference should not exceed the amount of time of the unmoderated caucus.
 - b. An example of a Press Conference motion: The delegate of the Netherlands calls for an unmoderated caucus of 20 minutes, of which 3 minutes will consist of a press conference.
 - c. In effect, this would mean the press conference requesters will have 3 minutes to speak, and the left-over time in the unmoderated caucus can be used for questions from the press team, or continue as a normal unmoderated caucus.
2. Motioning:
 - a. Delegates will create an outlining press note which consists of who will be part of the press conference and what they will discuss within the conference.
 - i. Sponsors (a minimum of 2 and maximum of 3)
 - ii. Signatories
 - iii. Unmoderated caucus time requested (of which 3 minutes will be press conference time)
 - iv. Topics discussed in the conference, including some detail
 - b. If the press conference gathers $\frac{2}{3}$ of the council as either sponsors or signatories, the press conference motion is passed automatically after the press note is successfully submitted to the chairs and accepted.
 - i. If all members of the council are sponsors or signatories that support the press conference, the press conference can be held in the name of the entire SC, but will not hold to the binding mandate of the SC, as all content of the press conferences needs to be suggestive rather than active (see point 4c).

- c. The Press Note will be submitted to the chairs, whereafter they will accept and read it out.
 - d. During the time between the reading of the press conference note and the actual press conference, delegates that disagree with the content of the press conference will be asked to send their notes/comments (one or two sentences) to the chair if they want them to be asked/noted during the conference by the press conference team.
- 3. The chairs and press team will convene to determine at what time the press conference will occur. The chairs will convey this time to the delegates, and debate will resume as usual in the time until the press conference. At the time of the press conference, the chairs will at their discretion interrupt the ongoing debate for the unmoderated caucus with the press conference.
- 4. Press conference proceedings:
 - a. The press will be played by the chairs and/or the press team at TEIMUN.
 - b. Delegates of the councils are able to watch the press conference.
 - a. Countries will not be able to ask questions, but they will be able to comment through chits.
 - b. The press team and chairs will act as members of the international press, asking questions.
 - c. The Press Paper will be based on diplomatic suggestions (if this does not happen, the USA will have to consider sanctions) rather than actions (the USA has decided to embargo Iran).
- 5. Press conferences will influence the narrative of the council. It is at the discretion of the chairs how the press conference is received by relevant parties, and therefore what changes occur.
- 6. If relevant, press conferences may be referenced in draft resolutions, as they are an official part of the narrative of the council.
- 7. The chairs have the right to refuse to hold a press conference.

Crisis

- 8. If delegates wish to address crises immediately, they can propose, write and pass separate clauses within the conference week separate from the draft resolution.
 - a. It will be binding and valid, affecting the council as it moves along.
 - b. Extensive debate is necessary before passing even a single clause in the middle of the conference week.

- c. Motioning, amending and voting for a single clause is done in the same way as for a draft resolution.
- d. Single clauses will (if still relevant) automatically be included in the final Draft Resolution, without the possibility to vote on it again.
- e. If single clauses are not relevant at time of the draft resolution (as suggested by delegates and decided upon by the chairs, at their discretion) it may be discarded as having occurred in the past, without being included in the draft resolution.

Press Notes Example

Sponsor: United States of America, United Kingdom

Signatories: India, China, Soviet Union, The Netherlands, Canada, Egypt, Chad, Brazil

This motion calls for an unmoderated caucus of 20 minutes, of which 3 minutes will consist of a press conference.

The Press Conference will be conducted to lay out the details of the peace agreement to solve the Yom Kippur war with the following key points / actions:

- a. The Meeting will take place in Istanbul;
- b. The peace agreement will first begin with a ceasefire from both parties;
- c. The Territories will return to status quo ante bellum;
- d. Arrangements for humanitarian aid and corridor will be as follows:
 - i. All conflicting parties must cease any hostilities and designate travel corridors to key cities within the Levant.
 - ii. Additional UN troops will be sent to the areas surrounding Istanbul.

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